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EMPLOYEES' RETALIATION CLAIMS UNDER
42 U.S.C. § 1981: RAMIFICATIONS OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
I. INTRODUCION
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union,' lower courts consistently recognized employer
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 19812 (§ 1981) for retaliation against
employees. Section 1981 prohibited retaliation against employees for
such actions as filing an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) charge,3 complaining of harassment against an employer,4
advocating the rights of racial minorities,5 or filing a civil rights
lawsuit.' Generally speaking, § 1981 was available to employees who
suffered from acts of retaliation at the hands of their employers.7
In June 1989, the Supreme Court substantially narrowed employees'
claims of retaliation under § 1981 when it decided Patterson. As a result
of this decision, § 1981 was no longer available to employees unless the
1. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 1981) (amended 1991).
3. Goff v. Continental Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1982).
4. Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., Engine Div., 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir. 1986).
5. Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, a Div. of Pullman, Inc., 678 F.2d 1211 (Former 5th
Cir.), reh'g denied, 685 F.2d 1383 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); see also Price v.
Federal Exp. Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1388 (D. Colo. 1987).
6. Goff, 678 F.2d at 597-98.
7. See Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1989); Miller v. Fairchild
Indus., 885 F.2d 498, 503 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056 (1990); Choudhury v.
Polytechnic Inst. of N.Y., 735 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1984); Cox v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 557
F. Supp. 1261 (D.D.C. 1983).
Virtually all retaliation claims filed under § 1981 involved adverse treatment after hiring.
See, e.g., Greenwood v. Ross, 778 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1985); Brown v. United States, 692 F.2d
61 (8th Cir. 1982); Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972); Gillespie v. First Interstate Bank, 717 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Wis.
1989); Robinson v. Vitro Corp., 620 F. Supp. 1066 (D.C. Md. 1985) (termination of
employment). Cf. Sisco v. JS. Alberici Constr. Co., 655 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 976 (1982), and rev'd on other grounds, 733 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1984); Garcia v. Rush-
Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr., 80 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Price v. Federal Express
Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1388 (D. Colo. 1987); Gresham v. Waffle House, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1442
(D.C. Ga. 1984) (discrimination). A minority of the cases involved an employer's refusal to
hire. E.g., Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 638 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064
(1981).
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retaliation by their employers affected the initial formation or
subsequent legal enforcement9 of the employees' contracts. The
narrowing of § 1981 seriously curtailed employees' ability to use the
statute's remedies for retaliation suffered during the course of employ-
ment.10
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA 1991) legislatively overruled
Patterson." Congress enacted CRA 1991 in response to the Supreme
Court's decision in Patterson and other employee retaliation cases.
Congress attempted to "restor[e] the civil rights protections that were
dramatically limited by [such] decisions."' By amending § 1981, CRA
1991 has expanded the scope of the statute's applicability to employment
contracts. 3
This Comment examines whether CRA 1991 will return courts to
their pre-Patterson recognition of employees' retaliation claims under
§ 1981, including post-termination retaliation, or whether some new
hybrid interpretation based solely on statutory language will result. Part
II explores the lower courts' application of § 1981 to employees'
retaliation claims prior to the Supreme Court's Patterson decision. Part
III analyzes how Patterson narrowed the applicability of § 1981 as a
remedy in employment situations. Part IV examines more specifically
how the Supreme Court's decision reduced employers' liability for
retaliation under § 1981. Part V presents an overview of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. Part VI examines the opposing arguments regarding
how to construe the recently amended § 1981 in respect to retaliation
claims. Finally, Part VII suggests how the courts should interpret
§ 1981's applicability to employees' retaliation claims since the passage
of CRA 1991.
8. Sherman v. Burke Contracting, 891 F.2d 1527, 1534 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
943 (1990).
9. McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 112 (7th Cir. 1990), cerL denied,
499 U.S. 919 (1991), and cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1270 (1993).
10. The phrase "during the course of employment" refers to all aspects of the
employment relation. See, e.g., Valdez v. Mercy Hosp., 961 F.2d 1401 (8th Cir. 1992)
(termination); Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036, 1052 (7th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 207, and reh'g denied, 113 S. Ct. 644 (1992) (failure to promote);
Sherman, 891 F.2d 1527 (discrimination).
11. H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 2 (1991). reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 630.
12. See id. at 1.





To fully understand the implications of the recently amended § 1981,
the statute's history must first be explored. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
(CRA 1866) was the first comprehensive civil rights legislation passed
by Congress; it was enacted to help enforce the 13th Amendment of the
United States Constitution. 4 Section 1 of CRA 1866 was codified as
42 U.S.C. § 1981,5 which states:
Equal rights under the law
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and
exactions of every kind, and to no other.6
This statute, inter alia, afforded all persons the same right to make
and enforce contracts as white citizens enjoyed.'7 In Runyon v.
McCrary,8 the Supreme Court held that the provisions of § 1981
applied to private contracts, including employment contracts.' 9 Thus,
a contract did not have to be available to all white citizens before it fell
under § 1981; it could be between private parties 0
A. Section 1981's Applicability to Post-Formation Retaliation
Prior to the Supreme Court's Patterson decision, courts broadly
interpreted2 the "make and enforce contracts" provision in § 1981 to
14. ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE
FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 4 (1985).
15. H.R. REP. No. 40(1) at 90, n.85.
16. Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 1981) (amended
1991) (emphasis added).
17. Id.
18. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
19. Id. at 168-69 (citing Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975);
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n., 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)).
20. Id.
21. The United States Supreme Court has set forth specific guidelines for courts to
follow when construing a statute. A court must first begin with the language of the statute
itself in order to interpret its meaning. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 570-71
(1982). A section of the statute may not be interpreted in isolation; the text must be
1996]
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include employees' post-formation retaliation claims against their
employers." The legislative history surrounding § 1981 clearly
indicates that Congress did not want this statute to be interpreted
narrowly.23 The 39th Congress was aware of the disparate and
discriminatory treatment toward employees that could occur regardless
of a valid contractual agreement24 and was intent upon remedying this
problem.
When Congress addressed these problems in the course of passing
CRA 1866, it was clearly concerned about the treatment of employees
beyond the initial point of entering an employment contract."
Accordingly, when courts interpreted § 1981, they determined the statute
was intended to cover post-formation conduct.26 Such conduct included
the act of retaliation against employees, although retaliation was not
specifically mentioned in either the statute or its legislative history.
In Goff v. Continental Oil Co.,27 the Fifth Circuit explained why
post-formation retaliation was a cognizable claim under § 1981.2" In
this case, an employee alleged he was terminated in retaliation for filing
a lawsuit against his employer for discriminatory conditions of employ-
ment and promotion. 9 Recognizing the plaintiff's claim under § 1981,
the court expounded its reasoning for allowing claims of retaliation to
be pursued under this statute:
Were we to protect retaliatory conduct, we would in effect be
discouraging the filing of meritorious civil rights suits and
sanctioning further discrimination against those persons willing to
considered as a whole by the courts. United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents,
113 S. Ct. 2173, 2182 (1993). If, by the words of the statute, "the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter, for the court ... must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). However, the courts must turn to legislative history for
guidance in construing the statute if the statute is not clear and unambiguous on its face. Id.
at 841-43.
22. See cases cited supra note 7.
23. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1866).
24. For example, employers in the confederate states were attempting to continue their
use of whips to get laborers to work harder, and many of the employers not involved in
corporal punishment were still passing down severe and unfair punishments for employees'
minor infractions on the job. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,206-08 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Report of C. Schurz, S. Exec. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 19-20 (1865)).
25. Id.
26. See cases cited supra notes 3-5, 7.
27. 678 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1982).
28. Id. at 598.
29. Id. at 594-95.
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risk their employer's vengeance by filing suits. Section 1981
would become meaningless if an employer could fire an employ-
ee for attempting to enforce his rights under that statute.3
The court's rationale did not depend on the statute's language. The
Fifth Circuit reasoned that in order to give § 1981 force, retaliation
claims must be found implicitly within the statute 1 The objective of
§ 1981 would be defeated unless the courts implied retaliation as a cause
of action under the statute.
B. Comparative Analysis: § 1981 and Title VII
Courts further supported their interpretation of § 1981 as including
retaliation by comparing that statute with Title VII, 2 which expressly
states that acts of retaliation by an employer are prohibited.3  In
Benson v. Little Rock Hilton Inn,34 the Eighth Circuit determined that
although § 1981 did not specifically prohibit an employer from retaliat-
ing against an employee for fling a claim against the employer, such
retaliation claims could be brought under § 1981. Further, the court
held such claims would be treated as if brought under Title VII. 5
1. Section 1981-An Independent Statute
Section 1981 contained "substantive provisions which, if violated,
[would] give rise to a cause of action independent of any other statutes,
including Title VII. 36 Even though an employee's claim of retaliation
was expressly covered under Title VII, the courts maintained the
availability of § 1981 for such claims.37
30. Id. at 598.
31. Id. at 598-99.
32. Title VII states in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any [individual] ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a) (West 1994).
33. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. (West 1994). See, e.g., Whitaker v. Carney, 778 F.2d 216
(5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 813 (1986).
34. 742 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1984).
35. Id. at 416.
36. Goff v. Continental Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593, 599 (5th Cir. 1982).
37. See Benson v. Little Rock Hilton Inn, 742 F.2d 414, 416-17 (8th Cir. 1984). Accord
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144-45 (1983); Greenwood v. Ross, 778 F.2d 455, 488 (8th




2. A Choice Between § 1981 and Title VII
Title VII was not intended to preclude the applicability of other laws
to employment discrimination. In fact, "Congress ... rejected an
amendment to Title VII that would have rendered § 1981 unavailable as
a remedy for employment discrimination ... . Congress wanted
plaintiffs to have options from which to choose when deciding what
action to take against their employers. 9 Section 1981, while protecting
similar rights as Title VII protected, was an alternative that did not
involve as many technical requirements for filing a claim. The courts,
giving effect to Congress's intent, made § 1981 available to employees
against whom their employers had retaliated."
3. Alternative Remedies Available
Although plaintiffs could choose either § 1981 or Title VII to support
their claims of retaliation,4' available remedies varied greatly. Section
1981 offered a broader range of remedies for employees; a plaintiff
could receive both equitable and legal relief, which often included
punitive damages.42 Conversely, an employee who sued under Title
VII could only receive affirmative job relief and back pay.43 Further-
more, if a plaintiff did receive a back pay award under § 1981, he could
recover pay beyond the two year limitation set forth in Title VII."
4. Advantages Exclusive to § 1981
While both statutes served to remedy retaliation against employed
persons, § 1981 offered specific advantages not available under Title VII.
One of the most significant differences between the two statutes was
that Title VII applied only to businesses with fifteen or more employ-
38. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 209 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 899, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. 238 (1972), reprinted in
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2179.
39. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5908, 5911.
40. See cases cited supra note 7.
41. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 144-45; Greenwood, 778 F.2d at 455; Goff, 678 F.2d at 598;
Sisco, 655 F.2d at 150.
42. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
43. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050
(1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 989 (1975), and rev'd on other grounds, 424 U.S. 747 (1976); see
also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
44. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460.
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ees,45 while § 1981 was available as a remedy against all employers,
regardless of size.46 In addition, § 1981 had a different statute of
limitations than Title VII. 7 Thus, courts determined it was in the best
interest for victims of retaliation to have both statutes available as
avenues of redress for such claims."
C. Minority View: Advocating the Preclusion of Retaliation Claims
from § 198 1
Asserting that § 1981 should not be available as a remedy for
retaliation, proponents of this position argued that only Title VII was a
cognizable cause of action for such claims.49 In Setser v. Novack Inv.
Co.5' the appellees, charged with retaliating against an employee who
filed a complaint of discrimination with the EEOC, maintained that the
appellant could only file a claim under Title VII 5 The appellees
argued that applying § 1981 to retaliation claims would undermine the
purpose of Title VII. Specifically, they contended that a claim of
retaliation under § 1981 "would subvert the procedural mechanisms
established within Title VII to address retaliatory claims."52
However, the court of appeals disagreed with the appellees and held
the retaliation claim to be cognizable under § 1981.5' The court
observed that because both statutes were independent of one another,
Title VII did not preclude plaintiffs from fMling a retaliation claim against
their employers under § 1981. Further, the court reiterated the belief
shared throughout all jurisdictions that "to deny [an employee] a cause
of action for retaliatory acts resulting from pursuing a claim under
§ 1981 would have the effect of giving 'impetus to the perpetuation of
racial discrimination.' ' '54  Until the Patterson decision, arguments
45. H.R. REP. No. 40(l) at 91.
46. Theodore Eisenberg and Stewart Schwab, The Importance of§ 1981, 73 CoRNELL
L. REV. 596, 602 (1988).
47. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660 (1987); see also Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261, 266-68 (1985); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180-82 (1976); Johnson, 421
U.S. at 462.
48. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144-45 (1983); Greenwood v. Ross, 778 F.2d
448, 455 (8th Cit. 1985); Goff v. Continental Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 1982); Sisco
v. Alberici Constr. Co, 655 F.2d 146, 150 (8th Cit. 1981).
49. E.g., Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 638 F.2d 1137, 1146 (8th Cit. 1981).
50. 638 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1981).
51. Id. at 1146.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1147.
54. Id. at 1146 (quoting Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian/Saint Luke's Medical Ctr., 80
F.R.D. 254, 266) (N.D. IMI 1978); cf Winston v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 558 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir.
1996]
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against the applicability of § 1981 to retaliation claims, such as the one
set forth in Setser, were unsuccessful, and claims of post-formation
retaliation were cognizable under the statute.
III. PATTERSON V. MCLEAN CREDIT UNION: THE SUPREME
COURT'S NARROWING OF § 1981
In Patterson, a former employee brought a § 1981 suit against her
employer for racial harassment, failure to promote, and discriminatory
discharge." The district court held for the employer. The court of
appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari on several issues.5" One of the issues
addressed was whether racial harassment during the course of employ-
ment was actionable under § 1981."7
The Supreme Court stated that because § 1981 prohibited racial
discrimination in the "making" and enforcement of contracts, it only
applied in the initial formation or subsequent enforcement of such
contracts, 8 and thus could not be extended to cover all aspects of
contractual relations. 9 The Court relied on its previous decisions
addressing the scope of CRA 186660 to determine that "[t]he legislative
history of the 1866 Act clearly indicates that Congress intended to
protect a limited category of rights."'" However, in both Georgia v.
Rachel and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., decisions cited in Patterson,
the Supreme Court liberally construed CRA 1866 to encompass a broad
range of civil rights.62 Further, although the majority mentioned
§ 1981's legislative history in Patterson, it did not address any specific
portion thereof, and the majority failed to take into account the history
1977); Ragheb v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 467 F. Supp. 94, 95-96 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Fralin
& Waldron, Inc. v. County of Henrico, Va., 474 F. Supp. 1315, 1322 (E.D. Va. 1979); Liotta
v. National Forge Co., 473 F. Supp. 1139, 1145-46 (W.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 629 F.2d 903 (1980), and cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981); National Org. for Women
v. Sperry Rand Corp., 457 F. Supp. 1338, 1346 (D. Conn. 1978); Strozier v. General Motors
Corp., 442 F. Supp. 475, 480 (N.D. Ga. 1977), appeal dismissed, 584 F.2d 755 (1978).
55. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 169-71 (1989).
56. Id. The court of appeals decision is reported in 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986).
57. Id. at 170. Although the Supreme Court addresses other issues, this is the only one
pertinent to this Comment.
58. Id. at 176.
59. Id.
60. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780
(1966).
61. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 176 (1989) (quoting Georgia, 384 U.S. at 791).
62. See id., at 192-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that speaks of interpreting this statute broadly.63 Instead, the majority
supported its decision by strictly interpreting the statutory language and
giving § 1981 no force beyond its specific wording.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the right to make a contract does
not extend beyond the initial formation of the contract:
[T]he right to make contracts does not extend, as a matter of
either logic or semantics, to conduct by the employer after the
contract relation has been established, including breach of the
terms of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working
conditions. Such postformation conduct does not involve the
right to make a contract, but rather implicates the performance
of established contract obligations and the conditions of continu-
ing employment, matters more naturally governed by state
contract law and Title VII.6'
The right to enforce contracts was also limited in scope, and the
Court concluded that this right "does not.., extend beyond conduct by
an employer that impairs an employee's ability to enforce through legal
process his or her established contract rights."65 In a 5-4 decision, the
Supreme Court substantially narrowed the applicability of § 1981 as a
remedy in harmful employment situations.
The majority of the Court felt that allowing § 1981 to cover post-
formation conduct would "undermine the detailed and well-crafted
procedures for conciliation and resolution of Title VII claims."66
However, as Justice Brennan noted in the dissent, the majority failed to
consider both the advantages of § 1981 over Title VII and the benefits
of a plaintiff having more than one avenue of redress when filing a
claim.6 7
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S PATTERSON DECISION: ITS EFFECT ON
RETALIATION CLAIMS
Retaliation was never mentioned in the Patterson decision.
However, once the Supreme Court concluded that § 1981 would no
longer apply to post-formation conduct, it was logical for lower courts
to conclude that § 1981 would no longer apply to retaliation either.68
63. Id. at 206-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 177.
65. Id. at 177-78.
66. Id. at 180.
67. Id. at 209-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036, 1053 (7th Cir.
1991); accord Penn v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 756 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
1996]
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For example, in Hill v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Inc.,69 a Tenth Circuit
case decided after Patterson, an employee filed a claim of retaliatory
discharge under § 1981 against his employer after he was terminated for
complaining to management about racial harassment on the job.7" The
court of appeals held that although the plaintiff's actions were laudable,
they were not protected by § 1981 because his complaint did not involve
the initial formation or subsequent legal enforcement of the contract.7'
Claims of retaliation made under § 1981 that related to conduct affecting
the terms and conditions of employment were no longer cognizable
under the statute.72
Because Patterson was applied retroactively,73 most pending claims
involving employers' post-formation conduct, both at the district level
and on appeal, were found to be outside the scope of § 1981.' 4 After
the Supreme Court's decision, the only way an employee could bring
suit under § 1981 for retaliation was if the retaliation involved the initial
formation or legal enforcement of the contract.75 For example, § 1981
69. 918 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1990).
70. Id. at 880. See also Alexander v. New York Medical College, 721 F. Supp. 587, 588
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Williams v. National K-R. Passenger Corp., 716 F. Supp. 49, 51-52 (D.D.C.
1989) cert. denied, 500 U.S. 953 (1991); contra Coleman v. Dow Chem. Co., 747 F. Supp. 146,
156 (D. Conn. 1990); Fowler v. McCrory Corp., 727 F. Supp. 228, 231 (D. Md. 1989)
(implicitly overruled by the Fourth Circuit's holding in Williams v. First Union Nat'l Bank,
920 F.2d 232, 234-35 (4th Cir. 1990)).
71. Hill, 918 F.2d at 880.
72. Id.; see also Harris v. Presbyterian/Saint Luke's Medical Ctr., 758 F. Supp. 636 (D.
Colo. 1991).
73. Judicial decisions are usually applied retroactively, even to cases pending appeal.
See Bradley v. School Bd. of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974); EEOC v. Vucitech, 842
F.2d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 1988).
74. E.g., Lytle v. Household Mfg., 494 U.S. 545 (1990); Harvis v. Roadway Express, 973
F.2d 490, 493 (6th Cir. 1992); Hill v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 918 F.2d 877, 880 (10th Cir.
1990); McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 110 (7th Cir. 1990); Carroll v.
General Accident Ins. Co., 891 F.2d 1174, 1175 n.1 (5th Cir. 1990).
75. See generally Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036,1052
(7th Cir. 1991); Trujillo v. Grand Junction Regional Ctr., 928 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1991);
Williams v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 920 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 953
(1991); Hill, 918 F.2d at 880; Carter v. South Cent. Bell, 912 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 501 U.S. 1260 (1991), affd sub nom., Allen v. South Cent. Bell, 976 F.2d 730 (5th Cir.
1992), and ceri. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1582 (1993); McKnight, 908 F.2d at 108; Sherman v. Burke
Contracting, 891 F.2d 1527, 1535 (11th Cir. 1990); Turner v. City of Beaumont, 835 F. Supp.
916 (E.D. Tex. 1993); Williamson v. Union Pac. R.R., 813 F. Supp. 732 (D. Colo. 1992);
Saunders v. George Washington Univ., 768 F. Supp. 854 (D.D.C. 1991); Robinson v. N & C
Constr. Co., 767 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Dash v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 753
F. Supp. 1062 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); Frazier v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 747 F. Supp. 1540
(W.D.N.C. 1990); Smith v. Continental Ins. Corp., 747 F. Supp. 275 (D.N.J. 1990); Butler v.
RMS Technologies, 741 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Mass. 1990); Kozam v. Emerson Elec. Co., 739 F.
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would apply to cases in which an employer failed to promote an
employee to a position requiring a new relationship and contract
between the employer and employee76 or for obstructing an employee
from filing a charge with the EEOC or gaining access to the legal
system,"7 but this statute would not apply to cases involving wrongful
demotion, 78 retaliation for civil rights advocacy,79 retaliatory dis-
charge,8 discriminatory working conditions in retaliation for filing a
charge with the EEOC,8 ' or disciplinary procedures in general.'
A. Arguments in Support of the Supreme Court's Decision
In Carter v. South Cent. Bell, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
discussed three basic arguments supporting the exclusion of retaliation
claims from § 1981.' First, the court stated that § 1981 was not
necessary for protecting employees from retaliation throughout the
course of their contractual relations because Title VII already extended
employees such protection. Title VII prohibited retaliation by
employers, and was an adequate remedy for plaintiffs.86 Second, the
court determined § 1981 was not applicable in situations where an
employee filed a complaint against his employer, because such action did
not impair an employee's right to enforce his employment contract.'
Third, because discriminatory discharge was generally not available
under § 1981, the court concluded that retaliatory discharge was not
available either."
In Carter, three employees of the South Central Bell Telephone
Company (SCB) claimed they were racially discriminated against by
Supp. 307 (N.D. Miss. 1990); Francheschi v. Edo Corp., 736 F. Supp. 438 (E.D.N.Y. 1990);
Jackson v. GTE Directories Serv. Corp., 734 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
76. McKnight, 908 F.2d at 109.
77. Overby v. Chevron, 884 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1989).
78. Jordan v. U.S. West Direct Co., 716 F. Supp. 1366, 1368 (D. Colo. 1989).
79. Hill, 918 F.2d at 880.
80. E.g., Williams v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 920 F.2d 232, 234 (4th Cir. 1990); Carter
v. South Cent. Bell, 912 F.2d 832, 840 (5th Cir. 1990).
81. See Williams, 920 F.2d at 234; Sherman, 891 F.2d at 1535.
82. Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036, 1052 (7th Cit.
1991) (citing McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 108-09 (7th Cir. 1990)).
83. 912 F.2d 832 (5th Cit. 1990).
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their employer.8 9 One plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC while still
employed at SCB, alleging he was terminated in retaliation for his
actions.9" The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that he was given
the right to file a charge with the EEOC by the Civil Rights statutes, not
by his employment contract,9' and thus his claim under § 1981 was not
cognizable.'
Further, in Overby v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,93 the Ninth Circuit held
that because section 704(a) of Title VII94 specifically prohibited
retaliatory discharge, there was no need "to twist the interpretation of
another statute (§ 1981) to cover the same conduct."95  The courts
determined that § 1981 was not applicable because filing a charge with
the EEOC did not impair an employee's right to enforce his employ-
ment contract,96 and again because Title VII already covered retalia-
tion.
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit held that because discriminatory
discharge was generally not available under § 1981,' neither was
retaliatory discharge." Were the court of appeals to determine
89. Id. at 834-36.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 840; see also McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 112 (7th Cir.
1990); Sherman v. Burke Contracting, 891 F.2d 1522, 1535 (11th Cir. 1990). Compare
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 650,659-60 (1987) (unions violated § 1981 when they
refused to oppose the employer's racially discriminatory employment practices, in violation
of their contractual collective bargaining agreement).
92. In a similar case, where an employee claimed he was terminated in retaliation for
advocating his civil rights, the Fourth Circuit held that retaliatory conduct neither prevented
an employee from filing a charge with the EEOC, nor obstructed his access to the legal
process, because such action was not a contract right. Hill v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 918
F.2d 877, 880 (10th Cir. 1990); accord Revis v. Slocomb Indus., 765 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Del.
1991).
93. 884 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1989).
94. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
95. Overby, 884 F.2d at 473 (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,
181 (1989)).
96. See Carter v. South Cent. Bell, 912 F.2d 832, 840 (5th Cir. 1990).
97. Id.; cf. Trujillo v. Grand Junction Regional Ctr., 928 F.2d 973, 976 (10th Cir. 1991)
(citing Williams v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 920 F.2d 232, 234 (4th Cir. 1990); Prather v.
Dayton Power & Light Co., 918 F.2d 1255, 1256-58 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250
(1991); Patterson v. Intercoast Management of Hartford, 918 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 906 (1991); Thompkins v. Dekalb County Hosp. Auth., 916 F.2d 600, 601
(11th Cir. 1990); Gonzalez v. Home Ins. Co., 909 F.2d 716, 722 (2nd Cir. 1990); McKnight v.
General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 109-10 (7th Cir. 1990); Courtney v. Canyon Television
& Appliance Rental, 899 F.2d 845, 849; Lavender v. V & B Transmissions & Auto Repair,
897 F.2d 805, 807-08 (5th Cir. 1990); Walker v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 904 F.2d 275,276-77
(5th Cir. 1990); Carroll v. General Accident Ins., Co., 891 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1990).
98. Carter, 912 F.2d at 840.
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otherwise, it "would be encouraging litigation to determine what the
employer's subjective motive was when he fired the employee: was it to
retaliate or 'merely' to discriminate?" '99 The court felt making such a
distinction would be pointless.' Since termination harms the employ-
ee regardless of the employer's motive, the court determined there was
no need to differentiate between discriminatory and retaliatory
discharge.' As retaliatory discharge was no longer covered by
§ 1981, such claims had to be brought under Title VIU."°
B. An Attempt to Narrow the Supreme Court's Holding
Several arguments were made in an effort to narrow the Supreme
Court's holding in Patterson. In McKnight v. General Motors Corp.,10 3
where the court of appeals held that an employee's claim of discrimina-
tory discharge was no longer cognizable under § 1981, the dissent stated
that the "right to continue to work, in the face of racially discriminatory
termination[,]" was still protected by § 1981.04 The dissent argued
that termination of an employment contract should not be considered
post-formation conduct, as the Supreme Court described it, for two
reasons. First, the dissent argued that in Patterson the Supreme Court
was concerned mainly with employer conduct occurring after the
formation of a contract but before its termination.' As its primary
focus was on racial harassment of an employed person, the Court did
not expressly state that discriminatory termination of an employee would
no longer be covered by § 1981.06 Second, because one aspect of
terminating a contract is the refusal to enter into another contract for
the future, the dissent concluded that § 1981 should apply to discrimina-
tory termination because it prevented the right to make contracts. 0 7
Although the dissent in McKnight discussed discriminatory discharge,
the same arguments may be made for retaliation. In Jordan v. U.S. West
Direct Co.,08 the district court determined that Patterson did not
99. Id. at 840-41.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 841.
102. Id.
103. 908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1990).
104. Id. at 117 (Fairchild, J., dissenting).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 118.
108. 716 F. Supp. 1366 (D. Colo. 1989).
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preclude a plaintiff's claim of retaliatory discharge under § 1981.1"9
The court stated that the right to enforce contracts prohibited employers
from retaliating against an employee who filed a lawsuit against his
employer."' Courts generally have not distinguished between retalia-
tory and discriminatory discharge when determining whether § 1981 is
applicable to an employee's claim, as the harm caused by either type of
termination is the. same."'
Although valid arguments for interpreting § 1981 as encompassing
retaliation have been posed, decisions such as Jordan have been very
rare and oftentimes overruled." After the Patterson decision, courts
generally determined that retaliation was no longer covered by § 1981.
V. CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1991
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, which took effect November 21, 1991,
has two main purposes. The Act strengthens civil rights protections
already in existence and restores the protections that were substantially
limited by recent Supreme Court decisions."' Section 101 of CRA
1991 was codified as the recently amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which,
together with the former § 1981, states in pertinent part:
(a) Statement of equal rights
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts ....
(b) Definition
For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce
contracts" includes the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." 4
109. Id. at 1368-70.
110. Id. at 1368-69.
111. See, e.g., Carter v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 912 F.2d 832, 840-41 (5th Cir. 1990).
112. See, e.g., Lytle v. Household Mfg., 494 U.S. 545 (1990); Harvisv. Roadway Express,
973 F.2d 490, 493 (6th Cir. 1992); Hill v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 918 F.2d 877, 880 (10th
Cir. 1990); McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 110 (7th Cir. 1990); Carroll v.
General Accident Ins. Co., 891 F.2d 1174, 1175, n.1 (5th Cir. 1990).
113. H.R. REP. No. 40(11) at 1.
114. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 1994). This statute in its entirety states:
Equal rights under the law
(a) Statement of equal rights
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
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Absent clear Congressional intent to the contrary, statutes that affect
substantive rights and liabilities are presumed to apply prospectively."5
Thus, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, affecting such rights and liabilities,
and silent regarding retroactivity, has been applied prospectively."'
Since CRA 1991 does not apply to cases in which the conduct com-
plained of occurred before the Act was passed,"7 there have been very
few decisions involving claims of retaliation in which the amended
§ 1981 has applied. Thus, the courts have had little opportunity to
construe the statute and to determine whether claims of retaliation are
now cognizable under § 1981, and if so, to what extent.
VI. INTERPRETING § 1981, CIvIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
Two arguments may be posed concerning how to construe § 1981
with regard to retaliation claims. To determine the more practical and
feasible interpretation of § 1981, each position must be considered in
turn.
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and
to no other.
(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined
For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce contracts" includes the
making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment
of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.
(c) Protection against impairment
The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.
Id.
115. See generally Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 639 (1985); DeVargas v. Mason
& Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 911 F.2d 1377, 1390 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1074
(1991); Gibbons v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 262 F.2d 852, 855 (10th Cir. 1958).
116. Rivers v. Roadway Express, 114 S. Ct. 1510,1518 (1994); see also Baynes v. AT&T
Technologies, 976 F.2d 1370, 1373 (11th Cir. 1992); Smith v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 794
F. Supp. 1035, 1038-39 (D. Colo. 1992).
117. See Hopkins v. Seagate, 30 F.3d 104, 105 (10th Cir. 1994); Postema v. National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 998 F.2d 60, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1993); Luddington v.
Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225,229-30 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1641 (1994);
Valdez v. Mercy Hosp., 961 F.2d 1401, 1404 (8th Cir. 1992); Ryan v. Ampco Auto Parks, 61
FEP 435, 536 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not apply retroactively to pending claims either. See,
e.g., Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1159 (11th Cir. 1993); Harvis v. Roadway
Express, 973 F.2d 490, 495-96 (6th Cir. 1992).
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A. Argument for a Return to the Pre-Patterson Interpretation of
§ 1981
Based on the language of the amended statute and its legislative
history, courts should interpret the amended § 1981 as a return to their
pre-Patterson recognition of employees' retaliation claims. Subsection
b of the statute specifically expands the Supreme Court's construction
of the right to make and enforce contracts under the Patterson decision.
Instead of applying only to the initial formation or legal enforcement of
contracts, § 1981 now extends to "the making, performance, modifica-
tion, and termination of contracts," and to "all benefits, privileges,
terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.""' By expanding
the scope of § 1981, Congress clearly intended to extend employers'
liability throughout their relationships with employees.
Although the statute is clear on its face, it is ambiguous as to the
scope of benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of employment it
protects. Specifically, the statute does not state whether retaliation
claims are to be included, as they were before the Patterson decision.
An argument, as set forth in Goff v. Continental Oil Co.," 9 could be
made that the objective of § 1981 would clearly be defeated unless
protection from retaliation is implied.2 However, before it may be
implied that retaliation is covered by § 1981, under the rules of statutory
construction the courts must turn to the legislative history to determine
§ 1981's scope of coverage.'
In its House Report, the Committee on Education and Labor
declared that subsection b of the statute is intended to prohibit all forms
of racial discrimination that may occur throughout contractual rela-
tions.' 2 The Committee went on to state that "the list set forth in
subsection (b) is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. In
the context of employment discrimination, ... this would include, but
not be limited to, claims of harassment, discharge, demotion, promotion,
transfer, retaliation, and hiring."'23 Thus retaliation, at all stages of the
contractual relation, is clearly covered by the amended § 1981. Even
those members of the House of Representatives who offered dissenting
118. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 1994).
119. 678 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1982).
120. Id. at 598.
121. See supra note 21.
122. H.R REP. No. 40(1) at 90.
123. Id. at 92.
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views regarding § 1981 agreed the statute needed to be amended to
ensure that victims of employer retaliation would have an avenue of
redress available to them throughout their contractual relationships. 4
The legislative history further explains why the Supreme Court's
Patterson decision had to be overruled. First of all, § 1981 "has emerged
as one of our nation's most important employment discrimination
laws." ' 5 When the Supreme Court substantially narrowed the avail-
ability of § 1981 to employees' claims of discrimination, including
retaliation, it had a disastrous effect on employees. In 1990 alone, more
than 200 claims filed under § 1981 were dismissed because of Pat-
terson,'26 and numerous cases. initially decided in favor of the plaintiff
were reversed or vacated. 7 - Further, equivalent remedies could not
be awarded under any other statute.18 As the Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor explained:
After the Patterson decision, victims of harassment, retaliation,
and other intentional race discrimination [could] not obtain
compensatory or punitive damages under section 1981, and thus
lack[ed] any means of obtaining relief under federal law for the
harms they ha[d] sustained. As a result, no adequate deterrent
remain[ed] against those highly offensive forms of discrimina-
tion.' 9
Aware of these problems, the legislature had to rectify the situation by
overruling Patterson and returning § 1981 to its pre-Patterson level of
effectiveness in remedying employment discrimination. Consequently,
the courts should determine that § 1981 is once again available to
employees who have suffered from acts of retaliation by their employers.
Further, this statute is not limited to retaliation that occurs during
the terms of the contract itself. Retaliation that occurs directly after
termination of the contract or between two parties that are not involved
in a direct contractual relationship is also covered by § 1981.130
124. H.R. REP. No. 40(11) at 75.
125. H.R. REP. No. 40(1) at 90.
126. H.R. REP. No. 40(1) at 36.
127. H.R. REP. No. 40(1) at 91. See, e.g., Lytle v. Household Mfg., 494 U.S. 545 (1990);
Harvis v. Roadway Express, 973 F.2d 490, 493 (6th Cir. 1992); McKnight v. General Motors
Corp., 908 F.2d 104,110 (7th Cir. 1990); Carroll v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 891 F.2d
1174, 1175 (5th Cir. 1990).
128. H.R. REP. No. 40(1) at 90-92.
129. Id. at 92-93 (citations omitted).
130. See generally Zaklama v. Mt. Sinai Medical Ctr., 842 F.2d 291 (11th Cir. 1988);
Hodgson v. Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc., 459 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1972) (post-




Section 1981 protects employees in their "enjoyment of all benefits
... of the contractual relationship."'' The term "contractual relation-
ship" clearly refers to employment relationships.'32 Such benefits do
not end simply because the employment contract terminates. As lower
courts noted prior to the Supreme Court's Patterson decision, some of
the benefits of a contractual relationship occur specifically after
termination, such as the post-employment benefit of an employer
providing fair and nondiscriminatory job references.'33 The benefit of
receiving job references is clearly part of the contractual relation
between an employer and former employee; and while the giving of
discriminatory references in retaliation against an employee opposing
unlawful conduct during the course of his employment violates § 1981,
it also deprives an employee of his or her right to enjoy all benefits of
the contractual relationship.
In addition, in Hodgson v. Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum,
Inc.,' the Fifth Circuit determined that the risk of retaliation is "far
from being 'remote and speculative' with respect to former employ-
ees[,]" for several reasons.' 35 First, the court found that when applying
for a job, employers always require names of previous employers as
references. 3 6 Potential employers are not likely to hire an applicant
once they receive poor evaluations or hear that the applicant filed a
complaint against a previous employer. Second, the court determined
that an employee may be retaliated against if a new employer learned
of the employee complaining of discrimination or filing a charge against
a former employer. 37  Third, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that if an
Disabilities, Cleveland Developmental Ctr., 721 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (no direct
contractual relationship).
131. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 1994).
132. See cases cited supra note 7.
133. Zaklama, 842 F.2d at 294. In this case, the court reasoned that:
To permit a covered employer to exploit circumstances peculiarly affording it the
capability of discriminatorily interfering with an individual's employment opportuni-
ties with another employer, while it could not do so with respect to employment in
its own service, would be to condone continued use of the very criteria for
employment that Congress has prohibited.
Id. (quoting Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
Although the court is discussing Title VII, this same argument applies to § 1981. Id. at 295.
134. 459 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1972).





employee ever needed to return to the former employer against whom
he had filed a complaint of discrimination, that employee would risk
retaliation to the same extent as a present employee who had filed such
a claim.'38 Thus, the court concluded that "[tihere is no ground for
affording any less protection to [a] defendant's former employees than
to its present employees."'39
Prior to the Patterson decision, § 1981 had been interpreted to apply
to post-contractual retaliation. 4 More specifically, § 1981 prohibited
acts of retaliation made by an employer against a former employee.
With the passage of CRA 1991, and the return of § 1981 to its pre-
Patterson role as an effective avenue of redress against retaliation, courts
must once again interpret the statute to cover post-termination
retaliation. By expanding the scope of § 1981, Congress clearly
prohibited employers from discriminatorily interfering with an employ-
ee's contractual relations, either present or future.'41
2. Indirect Employment Relationship
A direct employment relationship is not required for such interfer-
ence to fall under § 1981.142 Nothing in the language of either former
§ 1981 or the newly amended version states that the statute applies only
if the parties are in a direct employment relationship. In fact, the
language of both versions suggests just the opposite.43 An individual
may not escape liability merely because he is not a direct employer of
the plaintiff
So long as a person has the ability to affect an employee's position
with an employer, that person should be liable under § 1981 for any
discriminatory interference with that employee's contractual relationship,
including employment opportunities.1' For example, in Sibley Memo-
rial Hospital v. Wilson,45 a hospital refused to refer a self-employed
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See cases cited supra note 130.
141. H.R. REP. No. 40(1) at 92.
142. Kolb v. Department of Mental Retardation and Development Disabilities,
Cleveland Developmental Ctr., 842 F.2d 885, 891-92 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (quoting Coley v. M
& M Mars, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1073, 1076 (M.D. Ga. 1978)). Accord Faraca v. Clements, 506
F.2d 956 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1006 (1975).
143. See Zaklama v. Mt. Sinai Medical Ctr., 842 F.2d 291, 295 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing
Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 698 F.2d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir. 1983)).
144. Id.
145. 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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male nurse to female patients.146 Despite the lack of a direct employ-
ment relationship, the nurse successfully stated a claim of discrimination
under Title VII. 47 The court determined that parties other than a
plaintiff's actual or potential employer could be liable under Title VII
if they control the plaintiff's access to employment and deny that access
based on unlawful criteria.' Although Sibley involved a Title VII
claim, the Ninth Circuit determined that § 1981 was equally broad and
covered such discrimination as well.'49 Thus, if a party who has
control over another's access to employment retaliates against him, that
party should be held liable under § 1981.
Not only does the legislative history speak of § 1981 covering acts of
retaliation made throughout a contractual relationship, but at least one
published opinion has already interpreted the statute as Congress
intended.5 In Wilborn v. Primary Care Specialists,15' the district
court interpreted the amended § 1981 as covering retaliation throughout
all aspects of the contractual relationship. Specifically, the court deter-
mined that in light of CRA 1991, any retaliatory action taken against an
employee for filing a claim of racial discrimination is covered by
§ 1981.152 The court explained:
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, ... which was
specifically intended to legislatively overrule Patterson. (citations
omitted)
Significantly, Congress noted that Patterson had been
"interpreted to eliminate retaliation claims that the courts had
previously recognized under section 1981," and the legislative
history explicitly states that the Act "would restore rights to sue
for such retaliatory conduct." (citations omitted)
Prior to Patterson, all circuits that specifically addressed the
issue held that retaliation by an employer following an employ-
ee's filing of a race discrimination claim-or otherwise protesting
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1341. See also EEOC v. Metzger, 824 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993) (employer
persuaded former employee's new employer to fire employee).
148. Sibley, 488 F.2d at 1341-42.
149. Gomez, 698 F.2d at 1022.
150. See Wilborn v. Primary Care Specialists, 866 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Inl. 1994). See also
Williams v. Carrier Corp., 889 F. Supp. 1528, 1529-30 (D. Ga. 1995); Lewis v. American
Foreign Serv. Ass'n, 846 F. Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1993).
151. 866 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. IlM. 1994)
152. Id. at 369.
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discriminatory employment conditions-[was] actionable under
section 1981. (citations omitted) 53
The court then determined that, based on pre-Patterson decisions,
retaliatory discharge is actionable under § 1981.11 This court's
determination makes clear that § 1981 should now cover the same claims
of retaliation as it did prior to the Supreme Court's decision. As the
court stated, any retaliatory action taken by an employer is actionable
under § 1981,15' both during and after the employment relationship.
In light of § 1981's statutory language, legislative history, and
supporting case law, courts should return to their original broad
recognition of claims of retaliation under this statute.
B. Argument for a Hybrid Interpretation of § 1981
Under subsection b of the statute, the definition of "make and
enforce contracts" includes "the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms and conditions of the contractual relationship.' 5 6  Congress's
intent is clearly and unambiguously expressed by the words of the
statute, and there is no need to consider the legislative history of § 1981
when interpreting § 1981.'
The language of § 1981 does not mention retaliation. It could be
argued that retaliation is not covered at all by the statute,158 but a
stronger and more feasible argument is that it is covered only to a
limited extent. Because retaliation has always been considered a type
of discrimination as defined under § 1981'151 it will undoubtedly
153. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 40(1) at 92, n.92).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 369-70.
156. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 1994).
157. See supra note 21.
158. The following argument could be made: Although Congress legislatively overruled
Patterson, it did not say the Supreme Court's interpretation was wrong because the Court
chose to look at the wording of the statute. Congress could have just put retaliation in the
language of the statute if it had wanted retaliation claims to be cognizable under § 1981.
However, this is an extremely harsh interpretation of § 1981. Congress did its best to
completely overrule Patterson in § 1981's legislative history, and specifically mentions
retaliation in its list of claims that are covered by subsection b of the statute. See RR. REP.
No. 40(I) at 92.
159. See generally Carter v. South Cent. Bell, 912 F.2d 832, 840 (5th Cir. 1990);
McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 107-09 (7th Cir. 1990); Hunter v. Allis
Chalmers Corp., Engine Div., 797 F.2d 1417, 1421-22 (7th Cir. 1986); Benson v. Little Rock
Hilton Inn, 742 F.2d 414,416 (8th Cir. 1984); Brown v. United States, 692 F.2d 61,62 (8th Cir.
1982); Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Constr. Co., 655 F.2d 146, 150 (8th Cir. 1981); Wilbom v. Primary
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continue to be so considered, particularly since the statute does not state
an intent to the contrary.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of § 1981 as it applies to
retaliation claims has little viability since Congress amended the statute.
Although courts after the Patterson decision determined that retaliation
claims were cognizable under § 1981, such claims could only be filed if
they involved acts occurring during the initial formation of the contract
or subsequent legal enforcement thereof'6 In CRA 1991, Congress
expanded the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 1981 by developing
an extensive list of situations in which a claim of retaliation will now be
cognizable.16" ' As there is clearly no intent to the contrary, this list
should be read as exclusive, not illustrative.
1. Post-Termination Retaliation
The statute protects employees in their "enjoyment of all benefits...
and conditions of the contractual relationship."'62 As Congress made
perfectly clear, the retaliatory acts must occur during a contractual
relationship.'63 In listing the circumstances where § 1981 is applicable,
the statute does not mention post-contractual conduct.164 Since post-
contractual conduct is not covered by this statute, it follows that post-
employment conduct is not covered either. The development of such an
extensive list clearly indicates that Congress intentionally left post-
contractual conduct out of the amended statute. Thus, whereas claims
of retaliatory acts occurring during the course of a contractual relation
are cognizable under § 1981, no post-employment retaliation claims
should be recognized under this statute.
2. Indirect Employment Relations
Further, simply because § 1981 does not explicitly state that the
contractual relation must be directly between an employer and
employee, courts may not assume there need be no direct relationship.
Generally, courts have frowned upon making such negative implications
Care Specialists, 866 F. Supp. 364, 369 (N.D. IMI. 1994); Carpenter v. Gulf States Mfrs., 764 F.
Supp. 427 (N.D. Miss. 1991).
160. E.g., Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036, 1052 (7th
Cir. 1991); Hill v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 918 F.2d 877, 880 (10th Cir. 1990); Carter, 912
F.2d at 840-41; McKnight, 908 F.2d at 108.
161. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981, subsection b (West 1994).
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when interpreting a statute.165  Although retaliation claims are now
actionable under § 1981, they should be limited to retaliation that occurs
during the contractual relationship. Included in the contractual
relationship are only such aspects listed in the statute. Retaliation that
occurs after termination of an employee or between parties with an
indirect employment relationship should not fall within the scope of
§ 1981.
VII. CONCLUSION: How THE COURTS SHOULD INTERPRET § 1981
After considering both arguments, it is clear that courts should return
to their original broad recognition of retaliation claims under § 1981. By
simply reading § 1981's language, courts will not be able to determine
the intended scope of the statute, and they will have to turn to its
legislative history. 6 Once the history is considered, it becomes
apparent that Congress legislatively overruled the Patterson decision and
retaliation claims are now cognizable under § 1981 to the same extent
as they were prior to the Supreme Court's decision. Also, the legislative
overruling of Patterson and the expanded scope given to § 1981 will
serve equity best'67 if interpreted as a return to the courts' pre-
Patterson construction of the statute. Thus, not only should retaliation
claims against employers now be actionable under § 1981, but they
should be viable claims when raised for conduct that occurs at any point
throughout the contractual relation, including post-termination
retaliation. Lastly, retaliation claims against a person who is not in a
direct employment relationship with the plaintiff should also be
encompassed by § 1981.
165. E.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 200 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). "[T]he absence of legislative correction is by no means in all cases determinative,
for where our prior interpretation of a statute was plainly a mistake, we are reluctant to 'place
on the shoulders of Congress the burden of the Court's own error."' Id. (quoting Monell v.
Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978)).
However, the Supreme Court goes on to state that "[w]here our prior interpretation of
congressional intent was plausible,.. . we have often taken Congress'[s] subsequent inaction
as probative to varying degrees, depending upon the circumstances, of its acquiescence." Id.
Since the lower courts before Patterson recognized claims of retaliation under § 1981 even
when there was no direct contractual relationship between the parties, see, e.g., Kolb v.
Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, Cleveland Developmental
Ctr., 842 F.2d 291, 291-92 (11th Cir. 1988), it appears that Congress's failure to address this
issue is probative of the fact that Congress did not want to limit § 1981's applicability to only
direct contractual relationships. See id.
166. See supra note 21.
167. See supra notes 45-48, 54 and accompanying text.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Through the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 1981 has been
reinstated as one of the most important employment discrimination laws,
and must be interpreted as such.
SUzANNE E. RILEY*
* I would like to thank Attorney Mark Rogers for his guidance and insight during the
writing of this Comment.
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